Book Review


Reviewed by

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This book review is very important for translation students, translation trainers, translators and generally, those who work in this field, since translation, on the basis of its scientific aspect, which is known as translation studies contains many different theories that are proposed by considering the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Therefore, becoming familiar with such this philosophical perspective can be helpful for better understanding this area and having a good performance of translation. Heidegger (1927/1962) in his book, “Being and Time” started with stressing on the significance of restating the question of being by bringing, and discussing over the issues related to “the presuppositions and prejudices which are constantly re-implanting and fostering the belief that an inquiry into being is unnecessary” Heidegger (1927/1962, p. 22).

In his book, he designed this question of what being means? Then, he emphasized on having a fixed and clear comprehension of “being” and also not simply interpreting it as understanding the meaning of “is”. He defined being as the being of entity with noting that the being of entity must be understood in the way of its own and must not be comprehended by the ancient Greek’s ontology, or by telling a divine story, or through those ontological standpoints, that root in divine source. Additionally, with referring the concept of being to entity, he emphasized on entity as what that must be interrogated. According to Heidegger (1927/1962, p. 26), being is “something is, and in its being as it is; in reality; in presence-at-hand; in subsistence; in validity; in Dasein; in the there is”.

He defined Dasein, as a distinct character in comparison with other entities. It indicates to the condition of Dasein “in its very being, that is an issue for it” (Heidegger 1927/1962, p. 32). In other words, Dasein has a relationship and connection towards that being, and this relationship is a different being. Heidegger (1927/1962, p. 32) stated that “Dasein understands itself in its being […]”. Ontically, Dasein is different and spacial, because of its ontological character. The term, “ontology”, in here, is not referred to a science as the part of metaphysics, or as an indication of the way that the concept of being can be studied and grasped through ancient Greek ontology. Ontological-being, from the perspective of Heidegger (1927/1962), is a pre-ontological being. It means that the question and study
of the being of Dasein must be regarded prior. Dasein’s being is ontological, since the being is an issue and question for Dasein. In addition, the being of Dasein can behave in one way or another way, and “always does comports itself somehow” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 32). This being is not ontical, but it is rather ontological, or a being that Dasein “has an understanding of being” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 32). Such this being was called by Heidegger (1927/1962) as “existence”. He stated:

Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence-in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, or got itself into them, or grown up in them already. Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or by neglecting. The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself. The understanding of oneself which leads along this way we call “existentiell”. The question of existence is one of Dasein’s ontical “affairs” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 33).

He named the context of existence as “existentiality”. That is to say, it is the state of being that is constitutive for it as existence. He stated that understanding that relates to Dasein’s understanding of its being as existence is existential understanding and not existentiell understanding. But, understanding that is obtained through the state that Dasein encounters, or maintains in an existentiell limitation such as death, discrimination, meaninglessness, voidness, sickness, etc., is existentiell understanding, such as understanding the concept of death. Thus, for understanding the being of Dasein as what Heidegger (1927/1962) called it, as existence, the existentiality of Dasein must be taken into account beforehand. He continued his words by noting that being in the world is essential and important for Dasein. So, understanding the concept of being, for Dasein, relates to these two primordialities: 1-understanding the world, and also 2-understanding the being of entities which are accessible within the world. Then, as a conclusion he stated: “therefore fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 34). In this regard, Dasein takes the first priority to be ontologically interrogated. Dasein is ontical, since it is within-the-world and also it is ontological, since its being in world is important and determinative for Dasein. Therefore, Dasein is ontico-ontologically prior, and it provides a state for rising and developing any ontologies. He stated that:

Dasein accordingly takes priority over all other entities in several ways. The first priority is an ontical one: Dasein is an entity whose being has the determinate character of existence. The second priority is an ontological one: Dasein is in itself ‘ontological’, because existence is thus determinative for it. But with equal primordiality Dasein also possesses-as constitutive for its understanding of existence-an understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own. Dasein has therefore a third priority as providing the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of any ontologies (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 34).

Dasein interprets and understands its being by considering time; the angle for interpreting and understanding its being. In other words, the interpretation and
apprehension of Dasein’s being can only be done, just in the light of the time. Time is the horizon for interpreting and understanding the being of Dasein. He noted that time is originated from temporality. That is to say, the temporal character of Dasein signifies that its being is in time. In fact, Dasein’s being has a temporal character, and by taking time into account, “various modes and derivatives” of the being of Dasein can be revealed, analyzed, interpreted, and understood (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 40). He said that “because being cannot be grasped except by taking time into consideration, the answer to the question of being cannot lie in any proposition that is blind and isolated” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 40). He further explained that “the fact remains that time, in the sense of ‘being [sein] in time’, functions as a criterion for distinguishing realms of being” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 39).

He defined temporality as the meaning of Dasein’s being and it is taken into account by him as a foundation in order to achieve the answer of the question of what the being of Dasein means in a total consideration of its being, since Dasein’s being have a temporal character. Temporality, as a condition and state, makes historicality possible and historicality “as a temporal kind of being” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 41), makes “Dasein’s historizing as such” possible (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 41). He further explained that “only on the basis of such ‘historizing’ is anything like ‘world-history’ possible or can anything belong historically to world-history” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 41). The historicality of Dasein is called by Heidegger (1927/1962) as historicity. In this regard, the being of Dasein can be interpreted as “what it already was”, or “it is its past” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 41). In other words, Dasein uses “its past” as its property for pushing itself behind it.

Dasein on the basis of its historicality can study, analyze, interpret, understood, and preserve tradition and reveal and disclose how the tradition is transmitted. So, Dasein brings itself into the kind of being which consists in historiological inquiry and research. [...] If historiology is wanting, this is not evidence against Dasein’s historicality; on the contrary, as a deficient model of this state of Being, it is evidence for it. (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pp. 41-42).

Thus, the raised question of what the meaning of Dasein’s being is, must be comprehended and answered by considering Dasein’s state of temporality. As said before, Dasein’s temporality makes the state of historicality possible. Dasein can investigate tradition and study it to understand and know what it is/was, or to find that how it is preserved or changed. In such these situations, Dasein is in the mode of historiological research, inquiry, or study. So, any historiological inquiry or study can only be possible, because of the state of the historicality of Dasein’s being (Heidegger, 1927/1962). Dasein is influenced by tradition; it more or less explicitly leaves its effect on Dasein and influences its being. Additionally, tradition can hold Dasein away from producing its own guidance both in choosing and inquiring.

Heidegger (1927/1962) expressed that the disputationes metaphysicae of Francisco Suárez, the vision of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel over the concept of logic, the ego cogito of René Descartes, person, reason, I, sprit, subject, and Immanuel Kant’s view on time were influenced by Greek ontology. In the opinion of Heidegger (1927/1962), the
major cause that Kant failed to have “an insight into the problematic of temporality” (Heidegger 1927/1962, p. 45)- which by considering temporality, he called all judgments, and analyses as “the business of philosophers” (as cited by Heidegger 1927/1962, p. 45)- is: neglecting, and not paying attention to the problem of being. Therefore, he failed to propose an ontology that the being of Dasein constitutes its theme. He stated:

[...] in spite of the fact that he was bringing the phenomenon of time back into the subject again, his analysis of it remained oriented towards the traditional way in which time had been ordinarily understood; in the long run this kept him from working out the phenomenon of a “transcendental determination of time” in its own structure and function. Because of this double effect of tradition, the decisive connection between time and the “I think” was shrouded in utter darkness; it did not even become a problem. [...]. Aristotle’s essay on time is the first detailed interpretation of this phenomenon which has come down to us. Every subsequent account of time, including Bergson’s, has been essentially determined by it. When we analyze the Aristotelian conception, it will likewise become clear, as we go back, that the Kantian account of time operates within the structures which Aristotle has set forth; this means that Kant’s basic ontological orientation remains that of the Greeks, in spite of all the distinctions which arise in a new inquiry. (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pp. 45-49).

Heidegger (1927/1962) emphasized that the concept of being must be brought into the light, and as a definite question of what does the being mean?, he expressed that the question of being must phenomenologically be treated. The term, “phenomenology” can be divided into two sections: 1- phenomenon, and 2- logy. Phenomenology means “the science of phenomena” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 50). Phenomenon or φαινόμενον roots in Greek verb, φαίνεσθαι and means “to show itself” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 51) or “shows itself in itself, the manifest” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 51). Phenomenon is equated with the term, entity, which “can show itself from itself” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 51) in many different ways, on the basis of considering it in each case and the type of accessing it. It can also show itself in such a way that it is not itself; it can show itself as something else which actually is not itself, which is what we call “semblance”. Semblance is in different with appearance, since appearance does not mean, a “showing itself” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 52).

Appearance can be defined as something that without showing itself announces itself; e.g., a particular disease announces itself through its symptoms. The second definition of appearance is “something that signifies showing itself, and therefore implies the appearance of phenomena, i.e., a phantom trace on a radar screen that is mistaken for a plane” (Munday, 2009, p. 2). The third is when appearance incorrectly be used for phenomenon which shows itself (Heidegger, 1927/1962), and the forth definition of appearance is something which is as a positive emissary of that which never can be seen, or through senses never can be sensed, or never shows itself as a manifest form. Munday (2009, p. 2) explained it in this way:
For instance, causal changes due to the passage of time announces itself in the greying of someone's hair, or the changes in a landscape, or the decaying of fruit, left in a bowl. All these instances appear to point to the existence of a thing called time, which otherwise does not exist as a phenomenon which can be seen in itself.

Then, Heidegger (1927/1962) mentioned the term, 'logy' to describe phenomenology -as the way for grasping and studying the concept of 'being'. Logy means "a speaking, discourse, treatise, doctrine, theory, science" (Online etymology dictionary, 2019), is adapted from 'logia' which is derived from the Greek noun, 'logos' (The free dictionary, 2019). Logos is defined as discourse, judgment, definition, reason, relationship, ground, and concept (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 32). He pointed to logos, in his special way, as discourse. He continued his words by noting that, logos as discourse is equated with δηλοῦν (Heidegger, 1927/1962); δὲλον, δηλοῦν means, to show, to make visible, to reveal (Online etymology dictionary, 2019). Dēloun, is originated from dēlos, δῆλος: visible, clear, manifest, and δῆλος is originated from the Proto-Indo-European (PIE) root, dyeu: to shine, and in derivatives is sky, god, and heaven (Online etymology dictionary, 2019). Heidegger (1927/1962) further explained that discourse relates to the state-of-mind and can be considered as the expression of intelligibility; discourse is the articulation of Dasein in relation to its being-in-the-world. Thus, as said before, it is originated from Dasein’s state-of-mind, and Dasein “expresses itself as discourse” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 204). He further explained that discourse depends on Dasein’s state of temporality. So, discourse can existential-ontologically be viewed. Thus, Logos or discourse can be true, can be false. Heidegger, (1927/1962) added that, the phenomenon must be grasped or proved through directly exhibiting and demonstrating its related object(s). He said that the other name of phenomenology, in a tautological way, is descriptive phenomenology.

Dasein in each case, has its mineness, which it is proved by expressing “I am”. “I am” is distinct from “You are”. Dasein can make decision to be in one particular way or another way. Dasein can be authentic or inauthentic, and also it can win itself, or lose itself (its can exit itself from the world that Dasein’s authentic being is within it, and leaving undone its aim, or being lost in the world due to not finding the authentic self or due to the state of confusion). It should be noted that, the inauthenticity of Dasein does not indicate to the lower degree of Dasein’s being. Instead, it indicates to the mode of Dasein’s being; inauthentic self; which Dasein “even in its fullest concretion”, its being can be inauthentic (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 68). The being of Dasein in both modes of authentic or inauthentic is settled under this fact that Dasein’s being “is characterized by mineness” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 68).

He said that, I, is the expression of Dasein and shows that, in each case, and with the change of its mode and its experience from the world, Dasein’ being belongs to and maintains for itself and can be distinguished from others. Therefore, the question of who is Dasein? can be answered by looking at this expression, ‘I am myself’. But, it is important that the question of who is Dasein? may not completely be answered by only considering Dasein’s assertion of ‘I’. In other words, it can “reveal itself as its ‘opposite’ [...]” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, 152). Heidegger (1927/1962) pointed to the assertion of the
being of Dasein as ‘I am it’ along with emphasizing on understanding the word of I “in the sense of a non-committal formal indicator” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 152).

He added that ‘not-I’ is attributed to those entities that do not have ‘I-ness’. Therefore, when Dasein says, it is/was not myself or I am/was not myself, it can be referred to the mode of the being of Dasein when it has lost itself; I am not my self indicates to Dasein’s state-of- mind which is in the condition of comparing its current being, authentic self, or inauthentic self (a drunken man who announces itself, that I am not myself to get help) to its ideal or to the authentic self of its past. So, Dasein, naturally in facing different new possibility/ies, tries to find the most potentiality of its authentic being. He further explained that, since ‘I’ is an existential, it must existential-ontologically be viewed. It should be noted that a natural person who can distinct the good way from bad way (for own self), in an authentic mode of being decides to be good or bad. In other words, it is its authentic being who decides. Moreover, Heidegger (1927/1962, p. 152) expressed that “[...] the who? is to be answered only by exhibiting phenomenally a definite kind of being which Dasein possesses”. According to Heidegger (1927/1962), man’s material is not made up by spirit as a synthesis of body and soul. "It is rather existence” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 153).

Dasein must be understood in the proximal average of its everydayness. The average of Dasein’s everydayness is not considered as the mere aspect of the being of it by Heidegger (1927/1962). In fact, any explication and analysis of the being of Dasein is stood on its existence-structure which Dasein as existence is constituted by the condition and state of existentiality. Heidegger (1927/1962) stated that the characters of the being of Dasein is called existentialia which is the plural of existentiale. For example, being-in is considered as an existential. On the other hand, category refers to the character of those entities that are not as same as Dasein in being (present-at-hand). For example, “the category of the insideness which things present-at-hand can have with regard to one another" (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 82). Additionally, those entities that have the existential-ontological root such as hammer, and glass are categorial. Moreover, those entities that are arranged by Dasein in a certain location- relationship as “being-along-with-...”, or “being-in-...” are categorial (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 79). Furthermore, Heidegger (1927/1962, pp. 155-156) stated that “the ‘here’ and the ‘there’ and the ‘yonder’ [...] have a signification which is primarily existential, not categorial”.

He emphasized on this point, being-in-the-world through explaining it by bringing these examples, bench is in room, and room is in building, and building is in university, ... till it can be comprehended and concluded that bench is “in world-space” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 79), or water is in glass and both water and glass are at a location, and in a space, and with expanding such this relationship, the concept of inhood can be comprehended (Heidegger, 1927/1962). He said that the being of Dasein in the world, as the existence, is a fact. Heidegger (1927/1962) with distinguishing the being of Dasein from the being of other entities implied the concept of “facticity” to Dasein which its being is regarded as being-in-the-world, and can be sensed by getting a clear comprehension and knowledge from its own being in the world “as bound up in its destiny with the being of those entities which it encounters within its own world” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p.
Moreover, Dasein has its own spatiality and particularity like, engaging with particular equipment at a special location. But, understanding the concept of spatiality, in such this way, is only possible by considering and understanding this spatiality, the spatiality of the being of Dasein in terms of its being in this world, as a priori. In other words, the spatiality of Dasein is because of its mode of being, being-in-the-world which Dasein in this mode is very concernful and familiar in relation to the entities of world. Heidegger (1927/1962) stated that the spatiality of Dasein depicts the characters of Dasein’s being, deseveredness and directionality. He expressed that:

Dasein is essentially de-severant: it lets any entity be encountered close by as the entity which it is. [...]. Bringing-close—bringing something close by, in the sense of procuring it, putting it in readiness, having it to hand. But certain ways in which entities are discovered in a purely cognitive manner also have the character of bringing them close. In Dasein there lies an essential tendency towards closeness (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pp. 139-140).

Heidegger (1927/1962) expressed that, the spatiality of Dasein’s being causes that it proximally to be in yonder, instead of being in here. He stated that:

If Dasein, in its concern, brings something close by, this does not signify that it fixes something at a spatial position with a minimal distance from some point of the body. When something is close by, this means that it is within the range of what is proximally ready-to-hand for circumspection. [...] The ‘here’ does not mean the ‘where’ of something present-at-hand, but rather the ‘whereat’ [Wobei] of a de-severant being-alongside, together with this de-severance. [...] from this ‘yonder’ it comes back to its ‘here’; and it comes back to its ‘here’ only in the way in which it interprets its concernful being towards in terms of what is ready-to-hand yonder (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 142).

Thus, region can be considered as the self-opening surrounded area that grants place. Additionally, he stressed on this point that when Dasein’s being considered as existence “it already has, as directing and deservering, its own discovered region” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 143). He pointed to the two modes of Dasein’s being. They are: being-inside as the being of Dasein in the world and being outside alongside the entities that Dasein faces, and they belong to the world which is already discovered by it. Heidegger (1927/1962, pp. 89-90) said:

[...] but even in this ‘being-outside’ alongside the object, Dasein is still “inside”, if we understand this in the correct sense; that is to say, it is itself ‘inside’ as a being-in-the-world which knows. And furthermore, the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one’s booty to the “cabinet” of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the Dasein which knows remains outside, and it does so as Dasein. If I ‘merely’ know [Wissen] about some way in which the being of entities is interconnected, if I ‘only’ represent them, if I ‘do no more’ than ‘think’
about them, I am no less alongside the entities outside in the world than when I originally grasp them. Even the forgetting of something, in which every relationship of being towards what one formerly knew has seemingly been obliterated, must be conceived as a modification of the primordial being-in; and this holds for every delusion and for every error.

He pointed to the term, world as a phenomenon and emphasized on what that constitutes it- entities that can be interpreted as the things of nature, or present-at-hand, like stars, mountains, rivers, and the like. He stressed on comprehending the being of these entities that are regarded as the things of nature or present-at-hands, as the primitive way and first step in order to understand the concept of world. He continued his words by expressing that even if the nature or the entities of world be comprehended, they are the entities-within-the-world. Therefore, the world is not clearly defined and the question of what is world? has still maintained. Then, with designing these questions: must the world subjectively be interpreted by Dasein? and how can we define the common world?, he shed the light on the concept of the ‘worldhood of the world’. With bringing four vital considerations, he defined the term, world. They are as followings:

1- World signifies the totality of entities that are considered as present-at-hand within-the-world.

2- World, in particular, is considered as a realm that contains those entities that are regarded as ready-to-hand, or equipment which Dasein encounters them and employs them in the proximal average of its everydayness, like the world of mathematician.

3- World can be defined as where that Dasein lives in it; “world has here the pre-ontological existentiell signification” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 93), since the being of Dasein in the world is important for it and depends on this world.

4- World presents its being with its character, “worldhood” or “being the world as such”.

He further explained that the term, ‘worldy’ which is derived from “world” indicates to the kind of the being of Dasein; it is an existentiale. This term cannot be given to the being of those entities that are regarded as present-at-hand. Heidegger (1927/1962) stated that ‘belonging to the world’ or ‘within the world’ must be referred to the kind of the being of them. He stated that, the answer of this question, what is world? in terms of only considering Dasein’s being is “wherein that the factual Dasin can be said to live” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 93). So, worldhood as the character of the world which in its meaning is equated with the being of world as such, is the structure of one of the constitutive element of this existentiale, the being of Dasein in the world. In other words, this character, worldhood or the being of world as such can be viewed both existential-ontologically and onically.

Heidegger (1927/1962) stressed on more explicating the phenomenon of ready-to-hand or equipment. He stated that the being of equipment as a sign, indicates to the relation of its being to something. He clarified that, every indicating and referring is as relating, and every indicating is as referring, but every referring cannot be as indicating. He separated referring from indicating. He distinguished those ready-to-hands or equipment that don’t
act as sign, like hammer, which Dasein uses for hammering, from those ready-to-hand and equipment that are used for indicating, like the ball for the mariner’s storm warning, or the red arrow as a sign for driving- with noting that “indicating” is ontologically insufficient, or is not based on the ontological root of equipment as using its being as equipment towards-which or it is originated from the being-structure of sign which is known as serviceability-for; sign is rather “[...] the for-which of usability” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 116). In other words, the equipment that is employed for indicating, as sign, is used “in a very special way” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 110). On the other hand, the equipment that its serviceability is not on the basis of indicating- but it refers to itself (equipment) as equipment, is known by the character of its being as “serviceability- towards-which”, like hammer.

It should be noted that, in fetishism and magic, signs were used by primitive Dasein for objectifying and must be distinct from what has been considered till now, as equipment. According to Heidegger (1927/1962, p. 113), such this “sign itself always is what it indicates”. In fact, it is a sign-thing that stands as a particular object as the result of the act of objectification. Consequently, all entities which are ready-to-hand does not just have the being, as equipment. Those entities which their being are regarded as equipment have the character of being involved in something in such a way that its being be freed for involving by Dasein, in terms of its concern. He further explained the term, involvement when the ready-to-hand/equipment is “proximally freed for its being” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 116). For example, hammer by the character of hammering be involved by Dasein in something. He noted that, involvement can be ‘towards-which’ or ‘for-which’. Heidegger (1927/1962) stated that ‘involvement’ must existential-ontologically be viewed. In other words, involvement exists in equipment, and also occurs for the sake of Dasein’s being (Heidegger, 1927/1962). He stated that:

Motor cars are sometimes fitted up with an adjustable red arrow [...]. This sign is an item of equipment which is ready-to-hand for the driver in his concern with driving [...]. This sign is ready-to-hand within-the-world in the whole equipment-context of vehicles and traffic regulations. It is equipment for indicating, and as equipment, it is constituted by reference or assignment. [...]. But an entity may have serviceability without thereby becoming a sign. As equipment, a ‘hammer’ [...]. An entity is discovered when it has been assigned or referred to something, and, referred as that entity which it is. With any such entity there is an involvement which it has in something. The character of being which belongs to the ready-to-hand is must such an involvement (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pp. 108-115).

Distinguishing Dasein’s being from ‘others’, doesn’t relate to this assumption, Dasein’s authentic self indicates to this point that Dasein must have an isolated character. Dasein encounters the ‘others’, and with regard to others and possibilities can find its authentic self. Heidegger (1927/1962, p. 156) stated that “this Dasein-with of the others is disclosed within-the-world for a Dasein, and so too for those who are Daseins with us [die Mitdaseienden], only because Dasein in itself is essentially being-with”. The being-with of Dasein is an existentiale and cannot be distinct from Dasein, and even missing or ignoring it, is due to the existence of being-with as the existentiale, or the character of
Dasein. The deficient mode of being-with as the aspect or mode of the being of Dasein can be named as being-alone which must be distinct from the other deficient modes of being such as, taking a rest. In other words, this deficient mode of being-with can be regarded as the opposite reaction of Dasein against the existentiale or this character of its being, being-with. In addition, ‘other’ must not be considered as the object which is, as same as ready-to-hand, or equipment. Instead, other must be regarded as phenomenon that, in its being, is like Dasein. Moreover, the ‘other’ must not be named and considered as ‘human-thing-present-at-hand’, when Dasein sees it as just standing-around. Standing-around is the deficient mode of the being of Dasein. More clearly, the being of other(s) is like the being of Dasein and must not be named as ‘ready-to-hand’, or ‘present-at-hand’.

Heidegger (1927/1962) said that solicitude is a state of mind that Dasein has in its relation with other(s) whom has(have) the same being like Dasein; in its mode of being-with-one-another. For example, in welfare job, which is grounded on the condition of the being of Dasein with others. Totally, being against, being for, passing one-another by, being without one-another, not mattering to one-another relate to solicitude. According to him, two extreme positive modes of being that relate to solicitude are: 1- leaping-in for another Dasein, and 2- leaping-ahead of another Dasein (Heidegger, 1927/1962). Hass (1988, p. 85) stated:

Leaping-in takes over the other's project and thereby throws the other out of it. [...]. This mode would occur when say, one student writes a paper for another student, or when one person does all the talking for another in a social situation. [...]. For one to leap-ahead of another is to carry out a project which allows the other to see that project as a possible concern of theirs-say when parents’ talking among themselves serves as a model to a child who is learning to speak. In leaping-ahead, one Dasein’s concern helps the other become transparent to himself... and free for (the project).

The first mode of being causes that the other Dasein be dominated and dependent. On the other hand, the second one causes that the other Dasein to be free and transparent for it. Stover (n.d., para, 1) said that “authentic solicitude allows a Dasein to open up the possibilities of other Daseins instead of imposing one’s own possibilities upon the others and reducing them to dependency”. Thus, being-with is not attributed to Dasein, and it is an existentiale and Dasein's being contains this character in any condition. In addition, Dasein’s care [in a general consideration] which its different modes of being-with root in it, proves that Dasein, in its being, is different from the being of others; whether when Dasein’s being is behind the others and tries to reach the same position in its relation to them, or whether when Dasein is in the mode of ordering, or ruling on other(s), or whether when Dasein in the position of suppressing the other(s), etc., (Heidegger, 1927/1962). Being-with produces disturbance for Dasein and this disturbance can lead to Dasein’s taking care of the distance between itself and the other(s), or control it, or Dasein’s taking care of its position or being, in terms of the character of its being, being-with or can put Dasein in the mode of being-for as solicitude for or taking care of other(s). In this regard, being-with is the illustrator of Dasein’s distanciality.
He stated that, Dasein’s character of being-with causes that its being to have a submissive character (in terms of possibilities and defining its authenticity that Dasein in its average of everydayness be involved with particular equipment for the sake of the authentic being of Dasein, being away from its world and gets a submissive character like a gladiator, or when it is surrounded by two ends of death; Dasein in an awkward environment be employed just for working, since Dasein in the mode of working is facing the death and if Dasein doesn’t work, it again faces the death, like Egyptian slaves) or an inauthentic role, or a tendency to down the level of the being of others or a suppressive character (its inauthenticity is considered by comparing its authentic being as a suppressor in terms of its proximal authentic being as its ideal or that of was in its past). Thus, the self of Dasein may not be a suppressor, or a ruler, but in publicity, or encountering the other(s), Dasein behaves, to give the submissive or obedient character to the being of others, or moving the being of others in terms of its desire, goal, and plan that Dasein has thought out, and arranged its authentic being. So, being-with can be characterized by different structural moments such as, levelling down, distantiaility, averageness, publicness, etc. Moreover, being-with can cause that Dasein’s gets an inauthentic role towards the desire, plan, and goal of the other(s). Others is the ambiguous, ‘They’. Heidegger (1927/1962, p. 165) said that:

The ‘they’ is there alongside everywhere [ist iiberall dabei], but in such a manner that it has always stolen away whenever Dasein presses for a decision. Yet because the ‘they’ presents every judgment and decision as its own, it deprives the particular Dasein of its answerability. The ‘they’ can, as it were, manage to have ‘them’ constantly invoking it. It can be answerable for everything most easily, because it is not someone who needs to vouch for anything. It ‘was’ always the ‘they’ who did it, and yet it can be said that it has been ‘no one’. In Dasein’s everydayness the agency through which most things come about is one of which we must say that ‘it was no one’.

Furthermore, Dasein can be disburdened from its being, not only by considering what in previous mentioned, but also when the ‘they’ constantly accommodates Dasein - if Dasein wants to get “things easily and make them easy” for itself (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 165). Thus, the ‘they’- keeps and increases the mode of the stubborn dominion of Dasein. So, the ‘they’ acts as a serious obstacle and prevents Dasein from flourishing and opening up its own most potentiality for being itself, in terms of considering possibilities. So, the answer of the question of, who is Dasein in its everydayness? Is nobody, since Dasein in the proximal average of its everydayness is as other in the both modes of being-among-one-another and being-with-one-another. Dasein’s being as, other, in the proximal average of its everydayness reveals its being as nobody. Therefore, in the mode of being-among-one-another or being-with-one-another, the other, also can be referred to Dasein, and no one is itself. Dasein in this mode of being, being-with, ‘is as an ens realissimum’, that is grasped by considering this reality, being-with is the character of Dasein (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 166). In the modes of being-among-one-another, or being-with-one-another, when Dasein gets the inauthentic role as other, Dasein’s being as ‘other’ is distinct from its authentic self or its authentic being. Totally, Dasein’s being can be divided into two different selves: 1- authentic self (standing by itself), and 2-
inauthentic self as other. In terms of what has been said so far, enumerating the possible conditions that Dasein considers itself as an inauthentic self or other is necessary. They are as followings:

1- When Dasein is in the mode of confusion, cannot find the possibilities and arrange its authentic being.

2- When Dasein goes for the mode of solicitude for other(s) or taking care of other(s); being alongside its world that the authentic being is within it.

3- Exiting from its authentic being or the world that the authentic being of Dasein is within it; taking away the work.

4- When Dasein is in the mode of comparing its authentic or inauthentic self to its ideal, or because of its strange feeling.

5- When Dasein anticipates or considers the possibilities but cannot produce a resolution.

6- When Dasein does not have freedom of its own or it is forced, so can compare itself to its ideal-self or the authentic self of its past.

7- In two different circumstances, Dasein authentic selves be compared with each other and one authentic self with regards to another be recognized as inauthentic self, it is point to being good or bad, like a person who is/was guilty because of doing crimes (as inauthentic self) in comparison with its past/its now, as a virtuous person.

8- Dasein prefers or decides to do something but it is not really eager to do it, and can named its mode of being (authentic being) as an inauthentic being.

9- In terms of considering the point of view, one regards its being as inauthentic, a person who wants to do crime, can call its current being as inauthentic being (being as a virtuous person).

10- When Dasein feels dependency and wants to get things easily.

Heidegger (1927/1962) said that authentic self must be regarded based on the selfsameness of Dasein in proximal average of its everydayness and also in its total life. Heidegger (1927/1962, p. 167) stated that:

Proximally, factual Dasein is in the with-world, which is discovered in an average way. Proximally, it is not ‘I’, in the sense of my own self, that ‘am’, but rather the others, whose way is that of the ‘they’. In terms of the ‘they’, and as the ‘they’, I am ‘given’ proximally to ‘myself’ [mir ‘selbst’]. Proximally Dasein is ‘they’, and for the most part it remains so. If Dasein discovers the world in its own way [eigens] and brings it close, if it discloses to itself its own authentic being, then this discovery of the ‘world’ and this disclosure of Dasein are always accomplished as a clearing away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein bars its own way.

Heidegger (1927/1962) stated that Aristotle’s concept of truth that is defined on the basis of judgment that must be proved by “the agreement of the judgment with its object” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 257) “is very general and empty” (Heidegger, 1927,1962, p. 258). He said that agreement, or truth contains a relation. But, every relation is not
agreement. He explained that, “a sign points at what is indicated. such indicating is a
relation, but not an agreement of the sign with what is indicated” (Heidegger, 1927/1962,
p. 258). He said that truth must be established based on considering Dasein’s being as
existence. Dasein’s being as existence can generally be comprehended and recognized by
considering these vital elements:

1- Thrownness; is a perennial condition that Dasein finds its being as it is thrown into the
world; “as something which has been thrown into the world” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p.
400). He stated that “thrownness is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered
over” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 174).

2- Temporality; it constitutes the temporal character of the being of Dasein and meaning
of the being of it. Temporality also makes historicality possible. In other words,
historicality is generated from Dasein’s state of temporality- and causes that Dasein’s
being to be historical, and makes its historizing as such possible.

3- Care; it is an existentiale, and the being of Dasein is visible as care.

4- Projection; it refers to Dasein’s understanding itself- in here the character of
understanding is projection- in terms of considering possibilities. Projection causes
Dasein to comport itself towards the being that has been thought out, and Dasein has
arranged for itself. Projection indicates to the authentic being of Dasein.

5- Falling of Dasein; it indicates to the state of being that Dasein’s being separates from
the state of authenticity. It indicates to the state of inauthenticity, when Dasein is in the
mode of inauthentic self; it is also interpreted as the state of being that is untruth.

Heidegger (1927/1962) believed uncovering the being of Dasein must be as the result of
the confirmation of the being of Dasein on the basis of considering it as “[…] showing itself
in its selfsameness” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 261). Thus, interpreting Dasein’s being
must be on the basis of these steps that are brought in bellow:

1- Interpreter, first of all, must phenomenally describe Dasein, and the other entities that
have relation to Dasein, or Dasein has relation to them; e.g., equipment and other(s), those
who Dasein encounters them (descriptive- level),

• treating with Dasein and the other entities phenomenologically, and not missing
the unity in the process of phenomenally describing them.

2- Paying attention to the discourse of Dasein and also the others that have contact with
Dasein and comparing with the related actual behavior or comparing with the related
object the discourse is bout it. (descriptive-comparative level),

3- With considering number one and two, giving a view from Dasein in terms of
considering Dasein’s state of temporality (descriptive- level);

a- considering the being of Dasein in the proximal average of its everydayness,

b- considering the totality of the being of Dasein (e.g., considering it from its birth to
death).
4- With considering these essential parameters, having a unified and rational interpretation; this interpretation must phenomenologically be confirmed by the interpreter (interpretative-level),

5- With considering number four, producing final interpretation as the conclusion or outcome of interpretation (conclusion-level).

Thus, with considering these above items interpretation can be secured from deviations, prejudices, or subjective interpretations. He, defined Dasein’s understanding, as 1-existential understanding which refers to an understanding that Dasein achieves from itself as it generally is existence, or as 2-existentiell understanding which can be achieved by Dasein when it maintains in an existentiell possibility or limitation and it is not by getting knowledge about the discovered facts. On the other hand, ontical understanding can be achieved by studying the being of those entities that are not like Dasein in their being; present-at-hands. It should be noted that present-at-hands can also be viewed existential-ontologically. Existential-ontologically understanding refers to Dasein’s understanding the being of ready-to-hands or equipment that root in the being of Dasein or create for the sake of Dasein’s being, and also they can be ontically viewed, since they are not, in their being, like Dasein, and they are categorial.

Heidegger (1927/1962) explained that Dasein’s totality is surrounded by two ends: 1-birth or beginning, and 2-death. He noted that for interpreting Dasein’s being, two parameters of the totality, and authenticity of its being must be existentially brought into the light. On the other hand, the care of Dasein for not losing its existence situates it between this two ends. So, the being of Dasein between the two ends is kept through Dasein’s care for the sake of preserving the being of itself as existence. In addition, Dasein’s care causes that its temporal modes of being, over its different experiences, be sensed as its different modes of being are under the unification. In other words, the care of Dasein causes that Dasein shows itself through a constant selfsameness.

Therefore, the being of Dasein as a whole or the totality of the being of Dasein relates to its total life, or more precisely, it is from its birth to death. Although, Dasein is temporal-as its being is really actual in current or now or Dasein engages in a new experience-through the sequence of nows, it hops. Heidegger (1927/1962) stated that anticipation of death provides, for it, the possibility of understanding its own most potentiality for being itself or the possibility of understanding Dasein’s authentic self. Heidegger (1927/1962) said that conscience as a state of mind leads to the generation of anxiety. In this situation, Dasein, for taking care of its authentic being, tries to make a resolution. Consequently, it comports itself towards what is thought out or determined as a resolution. In other words, resolution as an abstract phenomenon is the manifestation of care. On the other hand, resoluteness is constitutive and necessary for the being of Dasein as such-in the world. He further explained that resoluteness is a resolution that Dasein shows it in terms of considering a particular time that it faces a possibility. He stated that “the resolution is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 345).
Resoluteness brings Dasein into its own situation or preserves Dasein's situation. In fact, the authentic being of Dasein as a whole can be possible only by its anticipatory resolution and its (anticipatory) resoluteness, and their manifestation by Dasein as having a mode of certain selfsameness. At the end, he described philosophy as the “universal phenomenological ontology” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 487), that “[...] takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existence, has made fast the guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 487).

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